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ABSTRACT 
One of the most difficult processes of digital forensics is to understand how new technology interacts 
with current technology and how digital forensic analysts can utilize current Digital Forensics 
technologies and processes to recover and find information hidden. Microsoft has released their new 
operating system Windows 8, with this new release Microsoft has added some features to the 
operating system that will present some interesting complications to digital forensics. 
Since the initial release of the Windows 8 Release Candidates there have been some research released 
that focus primarily on the new user created artifacts and a few artifacts that have been added by the 
operating system that might contain valuable information. This paper will look at the new recovery 
options that have been introduced in the final release of the Windows 8, and the impact that have on 
the artifacts. 
This paper will investigate the impact on system and user artifacts when the Windows 8 recovery 
methods are used. This paper will look the artifacts that are created between the different recover 
methods, as well as what artifacts can be recovered from the hard drive after a recovery method has 
been used.  
Keywords: Windows 8, Digital Forensics, Recover Options, System Reset, System Refresh, File 
History 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
One of the most difficult processes of digital forensics is understanding how new technology interacts 
with current technology and how we can utilize current Digital Forensics technologies and processes 
to recover and find information hidden. Microsoft has released their new Operating System Windows 
8, with this new release Microsoft has added some features to the Operating System that will present 
some interesting complications to digital forensics.  
Over the last year there has been plenty of research released that focus on the new user created 
artifacts and a few artifacts that have been added by the operating system that might contain valuable 
information. This paper will cover the new recovery options that have been introduced in Windows 8, 
and the impact that have on the artifacts.  
The first thing that this paper will cover is the artifacts discovered by the research of Amanda 
Thomson. Once these artifacts have been analyzed and verified the locations on the disk, a baseline 
dataset will be created to compare the impact of the recovery options on these artifacts. This baseline 
dataset will be used for finding artifacts on the system after a recovery option has been used.  
The final thing that this paper will cover is how the various recovery options impact the artifacts that 
are found on the operating system. This will be done by installing Windows 8 in a Virtual Machine 
environment and taking snapshots of a base image and then utilizing the various recovery methods. 
Once the recovery method has been successful ran, analysis of the Virtual Machine will be done by 
importing the image into FTK Imager.   
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2. GATHERING OF INFORMATION 
2.1 User Created Artifacts 
Amanda Thomson released documentation on various artifacts that the new Metro interface of the 
Windows 8 operating system creates (Thomson, Propellerhead Forensics, 2012). This paper will focus 
on the artifacts that are containted in the communication apps, internet explorer 10, File History and 
user created documents. This will create a baseline of data to search for and extract from.  
2.2 Volume Shadow Copy Services 
Within the Microsoft Windows 8 Operating System, Microsoft has enhanced the Volume Shadow 
Copy Services to be utilized by more than just System Restore Points. This service is also now the 
backbone of the File History Service and is also utilized with the system refresh. This paper will look 
at the integration of the Volume Shadow Copy services and what artifacts will be useful for analysis. 
This paper will examine how these artifacts are impacted and used by the various recovery methods 
(Microsoft, n.d.). 
2.3 System Restore Points 
 System Restore Points are created three different ways within Windows 8. Like previous versions of 
Windows these can be created via System Initiated process, and user initiated process. Within 
Windows 8, two new registry values have been created that allows applications to initiate the request 
for systems restore point creation. This paper will utilize the Communication Application artifact 
discovered from Thomson’s research as well as research of my own to compare between what was 
expected and how it can be recovered. As with previous versions of windows previous version copies 
are stored in the Volume Shadow Copies and van be recovered by mounting the drive and extracting 
the data.  
2.4 System Refresh 
Windows 8 has introduced the ability for users to recover from malware infection or stability issues by 
including the refresh option in the operating system. There are two options with the System Refresh 
that users can utilize. The first option is a default refresh which will revert the operating system back 
to a factory default setting and a custom refresh that allows the user to define the snapshot scope to 
revert back to. In gathering information on what artifacts are impacted and retained from utilizing the 
System Refresh this paper will analyze both the Custom and Default against my baseline and compare 
the difference. This paper will also identify new artifacts that are created on the hard drive from this 
process.  
2.5 System Recovery 
Windows 8 has introduced the ability for users to quickly reinstall the Operating System from a GUI 
for the user. The system recovery offers a few options for reinstallation; these options are Quick and 
Thorough Recovery. The differences between these two options are the ease of which data can be 
recovered. The quick recovery still allows for easy extraction of files on the machine; while the 
thorough recovery makes data recovery difficult. This paper will look at the impact on the baseline 
dataset artifacts when the recovery options are utilized and will also indicate new artifacts that are 
created when these are run.  
3. FILE HISTORY SERVICES 
Within the Microsoft Windows 8 Operating System, they have introduced file history backup, which 
changes the way backups were previously used. In previous versions windows could only maintain 
and restore backups using the default system. With Windows 8, Microsoft has implemented a solution 
that is more robust and allows backups to be stored both on removable media and remote network 
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shares. By default File History will back up the following folders: Music, Documents, Videos, 
Pictures, Desktop, Contacts and Favorites (Serban, n.d.). 
There are a few artifacts that are established when the File History is turned on these inclue the file 
history folder and registry values. The file history folder can be found in the following path: 
C:\Users\<USERID>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Filehistory 
This directory is also written to the backup location. Within in that directory there are two folders 
named Data, and Configuration. The data folder contains the files and folders that are tagged for 
backup using the file history. The configuration folder contains files that are both EDB and XML files. 
File names for the EDB follow the naming conventions of Catalog#.edb, and file names for the XML 
files are Config#.   
File History Config Values What does it mean 
UserName The user account that this is configed for. 
Friendly Name First/Lastname tied to account. Inherited from Windows 
LiveID if configured 
PC Name Name of the computer 
UserType What type of user this is 
Library Directories that are being backed up 
UserFolder User Specific Directories being backed up. Sub Value of 
Library 
LocalCatalogPath Filepath to the Catalog.edb and the config files 
Retention Policy How long data is retained 
DPFrequency How often is the data backed up 
Target The backup location 
TargetName Name of the Location used for backup 
TargetDriveType The options Local, Remote, and Removable are for the 
drive type that the backup is sent to.  
 
If the File History option has been turned on, there will be registry keys created in the HKU keys of 
the users that have this option turned on. This key can be found in the 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\FileHistory. Within this directory there is a key names 
ProtectedUpToTime which is a 64 Bit 
Hex Value–Big Endian, which can be deciphered by utilizing the DCode application. In Figure 1 the 
FileTime value is seen, in Figure 2 the value has been converted in the application DCode, this time 
represents the last time an update was pused to the file history system.  
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Figure 1 
 
Figure 2 
 
Another area in the registry that may containt keys of importance is 
HKLM\System\Controlset001\Services\fhsvc. Within this Key, there is a paramater key that shows the 
location of the configurations values.  
Another area to look at in gathering File History information is within the System Events. The 
following Event Sources provide us with information related to the File History: FileHistory-Catalog, 
FileHistory-ConfigManager, FileHistory-Core, FileHistory-Engine, FileHistory-EventListener, and 
FileHistory-Service. As of this research the event logs being parsed are the onces that show errors, and 
one that fires off with each successful backup, but claims something is missing and can’t be parsed. 
Until this operating system is further along, this issue might remain.  
You can also utilize the Jump Lists for the File History to gather more information on it. I was able to 
pull from the file history jump list, the various drives I used for my back up locations. This will be 
beneficial if the user modifies their backup location.  
If a Windows 8 machine has the File History Service turned on, it will persist over a system Refresh. 
These files can be found in the original directory.  
4.  COMMUNICATION APPLICATION 
Some of the more useful artifacts that are included with Windows 8 as the Metro App known as the 
Communication App. Amanda Thomson went into great details in her research on the artifacts that can 
be recovered. She showed that analysts are able to extract artifacts that will show who and how a user 
interacts with various online organizations and people (Thomson, Windows 8 Forensic Guide, 2012). 
From within the Communication App there are few locations that will provide artifacts for analysis; 
Thomson touched on the Cache and the Mail locations. This paper will discuss the following artifacts 
that I discovered in the application; AddressBook and Me directories. While there may be more of 
value, these two locations open up more insight on the users contacts and the accounts being used by 
the user.  
From the cache files analysts are able to extract the user online contacts details. These details include 
email, twitter handle, profile pictures, and pictures that were shared by the users contact.  From the 
cookies files analysts can extract conversation, email, email attachments, twitter communications and 
other communication transactions between users.  
From the cookies files analysts are able to extract user messages that have appeared in the 
communication app. Thomson’s research showed how email messages appeared in the cookies 
directory, this example shows how a Twitter stream would appear in the cookies directory. In this 
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example we can see the username that posted to tweet, the content of the tweet and the associated url 
that was included in the tweet.  
 
Figure 3 
From the mail files analysts can recover information about the emails the sender has sent, received, 
stored or even ads that have populated the inbox of the live account tied to the communication app. 
According to Thomson’s research the file path to the Mail directory is the users windows live account. 
This is no longer the case as it is now a random string. I have verified that by having the same 
windows live account across multiple machines and this 16 alpha numeric character directory does not 
share the same name across the machines.  
 
Figure 4 
Within the Mail directory are subdirectories that hold various files. The subdirectories on my 
machines met the following naming standards 1d00000# while in Thomson’s research these values 
were 1200000#, it appears that this naming standard follows the similar hex pattern, although at this 
time it is unknown what the meaning of the pattern is. The files in the subdirectories in my testing 
followed the naming standard of:  
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2000000#_##############.eml.OECustomProperty 
(14 alpha numeric characters) 
 
Figure 5 
The different subdirectories under the mail directory appear to be different directories in the Windows 
Live email system. In my case directory 1d000002 appears to be my inbox, the directory 1d000004 
appears to have been my sent folder, and the 1d00000b appears to be my draft folder.  
From the AddressBook file analysts are able to gather username of the contacts. All entries will 
contain a From field which will list the Contact name, at the end of the entry there will also be a list of 
all alias’s tied to that account. These alias can be email usernames, full names, first name, last name or 
even another screen name.  
For a contact with an associated email the entry will contain a Subject line that will have the value 
HasEmail if this account is tied to an email address. There will be a unique Hex String for each email 
address associated with the contact in the TO: field 
 
  
Figure 6 
For a Twitter contact the two fields at the bottom of the artifact will list the screen name first and the 
first and last name that was entered into the product. Since this is a twitter account and no email is 
associated with it there is no subject that shows the HasEmail value.  
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Figure 7 
For a Facebook contact the artifact will contain the full name in the from field, and at the end of the 
artifact the first line will again be the full name, the second line will be the first name associated with 
the account and the last line will be the last name associated with the account.  
 
Figure 8 
The Me folder will contain an artifact entry that will contain all the accounts that the user has 
connected to the communication app. This artifact follows the same structure as previous examples; 
containing the hex string of the email address, user name and the associated full name. As shows in 
figure X, I used a Hex to ASCII converter to change my stored email from Hex to ASCII. 
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 10 
 
Table 1 is an update to the artifact list which includes other artifacts be of interest to an analyst. I have 
included the location of the Cache and Mail artifacts as well as introducing the Adressbook and the 
ME locations.   
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Table 1 
Artifact 
Type 
Artifact Location Purpose 
Cache %Root%\Users\%User%\AppData\Local\Packa
ges\microsoft.windowscommunicatisapps_8wek
yb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCache 
Contains contacts email, 
screen name, or images the 
user has viewed. 
Cookies %Root%\Users\%User%\AppData\Local\Packa
ges\microsoft.windowscommunicatisapps_8wek
yb3d8bbwe\AC\INetCookies 
Copy of messages that have 
shown up in the 
Communication App.  
Mail %Root%\Users\%User%\AppData\Local\Packa
ges\microsoft.windowscommunicatisapps_8wek
yb3d8bbwe\LocalState\Indexed\LiveComm\%ra
ndomString%\%randomString\Mail 
 
Copy of users emails, these 
will contain sender, recipient, 
subject, body and attachments. 
Address 
Book 
%Root%\Users\%User%\AppData\Local\Packa
ges\microsoft.windowscommunicatisapps_8wek
yb3d8bbwe\LocalState\Indexed\LiveComm\%ra
ndomString%\%randomString\People\Address 
Contains username and screen 
name of contacts. If account 
has email address then email 
address is also stored in hex 
value. 
ME %Root%\Users\%User%\AppData\Local\Packa
ges\microsoft.windowscommunicatisapps_8wek
yb3d8bbwe\LocalState\Indexed\LiveComm\%ra
ndomString%\%randomString\People\Me 
Contains username and screen 
name of users accounts and all 
associated email addresses is 
also stored in hex value. 
5. WINDOWS 8 RECOVERY ARTIFACTS 
5.1 System Restore Points 
Windows 8 maintains the traditional Restore Points that have been seen in previous versions of 
windows with a few new tweaks. System Restore points automatically monitors files in the boot 
volume that are relevant for restore only, this is incompatible with previous versions. It allows users to 
undo a change that may have caused a problem with the system, or to revert to a day when the system 
might was preforming optimally (Microsoft, n.d.).  
Within Windows 8 a new registry key was added that enables application developers to change the 
frequency of restore-point creation. If the key does not exist then when an application calls the 
SRSetRestorePoint function to create a restore point, Windows skips creating this new restore point 
if any restore points have been created in the last 24 hours (Microsoft, n.d.). 
With this new registry key, developers can write applications that create the DWORD value 
SystemRestorePointCreationFrequency under the registry key 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore. The value of this 
registry key can change the frequency of the restore point creation.  
When the application calls SRSetRestorPoint to create a restore point, and the registry key value is 0, 
system restore does not skip creating a new restore point. If the application tries to create a restore 
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point, and the registry value is the integer N, than system restore skips creating a new restore point if 
any restore points were created in the previous N minutes.   
Developers can write applications that create the DWORD value ScopeSnapshots under the registry 
key HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersions\SystemRestore. If this value is 0, 
System Restore creates snapshots of the boot volume in the same way as earlier versions of Windows. 
If this value is deleted, System Restore running on Windows 8 resumes creating snapshots that 
monitor files in the boot volume that are relevant for the system restore only.  
5.2 System Refresh Points 
Windows 8 introduces two new options for system recovery, these options are: Refresh Points and 
System Recovery. Within Refresh Point there are two options; you can utilize the default refresh point 
or a custom refresh point. 
Both Refresh options can be utilized by Windows 8 to remove malicious files and corrupted entries 
into the operating system. When using Refresh it is important to understand that the operating system 
creates a Recovery Image that makes a backup of the Windows System Files. For the default recover 
these Windows System Files are from when Windows 8 was first installed. When the Custom Refresh 
option is used than the Windows System Files are from the date that the Custom Refresh was created, 
the Custom Refresh also will contain the desktop applications that you have installed. Refresh Images 
DO NOT contain your Metro-style apps, documents, personal settings or user profiles, this is because 
that information is preserved at the time you refresh your PC.  
When looking at an image of the Windows 8 operating system from within the AccessData FTK 
Imager there are three things that are quickly noticed. There are two partitions and an unallocated 
space. Figure 11 shows this layout, this is different from previous versions because of the Partition 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
The Recovery Partition comes up as Partition 1 in FTK Imager and is a 350MB partition. This 
partition is dedicated to the basic root of the operating system. This will contain information related to 
the refresh process of the machine. If a Refresh or Reset has been utilized there will be a new 
subdirectory called Logs, which will contain a file called Reload.xml. 
Figure 12 shows what the recovery partition looks like before a Refresh or Reset has been utilized. 
Figure 13 shows what the recovery partition looks like after a Refresh or Reset has been utilized. By 
looking at the two figures the difference can be seen with the addition of the LOGS subdirectory under 
the Recovery Directory. Within the LOGS directory there will be at least one file which will be called 
ReLoad.xml. There is potential to be other files only if a Refresh or Reset option has encountered any 
errors in the process.  
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                     Figure 12 
 
                                Figure 13
Within the subdirectories of Logs and the b1d8602f-6346-11e1-b08cff298f72d4a8 there will be 
artifacts that can indicate if a Refresh or Reset has occurred. If the Logs subdirectory is present than 
the timestamp on the Reload.xml is the time and date when the Refresh or Reset was initiated. The 
timestamp on the ReAgent.xml which is found in the b1d8602f, indicates when the OS was 
successfully installed, this will update to after the timestamp on the Reload.xml. 
 
 
 
Figure 24 
 
Figure 3
 
Within the ReAgent.xml we can see various configuration options for the System Refresh as well as 
see if it is a default or custom refresh. The first screen shot is the default refresh, the second one is 
from a custom refresh stored locally, and the final one is a custom refresh stored on a remote drive.  
 As we can see the images share similar data between them. This includes the following:  
 WinreBCD ID = is the same identifier of the folder on the system drive.  
 WinreLocation Path = Where the WIMRE.wim file is found on the system drive.  
 OSBuildVersion Path.  
As we can see in all three images, there is a value called CustomImageLocation Path that is populated 
when a Custom Refresh Image is created. Figure 20 is the Reagent.xml with the default Refresh Point, 
while Figure 21 is the ReAgent.xml with a custom refresh location. The only apparent difference is the 
CustomImageLocation path is now populated with the new file path.   
Install Date of 
OS 
Date of Refresh 
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Figure 16 
 
Figure 17 
To create a custom recovery image, you need to use the recimg.exe. When you create a custom 
recovery image, recimg will store it in the specified directory, and it is set as the active image. If a 
custom recovery image is set as the active recovery image, Windows will use it when you refresh your 
PC. All recovery images have the filename install.wim. If no install.wim file is fund in the active 
recovery image directory, Windows will fall back to the default image.  
 
Figure 18 
 
Figure 49 
The System Partition is identified in FTK as Partition 2. On a refresh this partition contains the 
following folders: root, orphan and unallocated space. It also contains the files called backup boot 
sector and file system slack. The root folder contains the files and settings used within the operating 
system. Some key information that can be found in this partition Registry Hives, File History 
configuration and data, contacts, documents, windows.old and other locations. Depending on how 
recent the refresh happened there might be a HTML file on the desktop that lists what applications are 
removed.   
 
                             Figure 5 
   
Figure 21
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The windows.old folder, which is located in the root directory, holds artifacts of what files and 
programs were installed on the machine before the refresh. From this information it appears that on a 
refresh nothing is uninstalled or physically deleted from the hard drive but marked to allow the space 
being over written, you can still access them through devices such as FTK Imager. The files System 
Partition that are marked for deletion can still be accessed and analyzed as normal. I was able to pull 
the Registry Hive files and run them through RegRipper and Registry Decoder for data analysis.  
 
Figure 22 
The Unallocated Space, contains unallocated file space, while there might be information stored there 
that will have value, I did not find anything in this research scope. The System Partition contains a 
wealth of information that should be interesting to an investigator.  
5.2 System Reset Artifacts 
When the System Reset recovery option has been utilized on a machine the data that was once 
available on a live system is no longer available. Depending on what type of System Reset option is 
used the data may not be recoverable. If a Quick System Reset is used analysts will be able to extract 
artifacts from the unallocated space which will include application, system and user data. If a 
Thorough System Reset is used than user created data will not be found in the unallocated space. Both 
the System Reset and System Refresh will create identical artifacts in the Recovery Partition, these 
artifacts will be an updated ReAgent.Xml and a Logs Directory which will contain the Reload.xml 
file.   
If we look into the Logs file we will see the file called Reload.xml within this file has some 
information related the refresh/restore process. We also notice that there is a file in the 
system32/Recovery called ReAgent.xml, this file can be found across all three images; Base, Restore 
and Refresh. When comparing the ReAgent file across the three platforms the files are identical. When 
comparing the ReAgent and the Reload files against each other they are identical except for the 
following line ScheduleOperation State. The first one is ReAgent, the second is the reload file.  
 
                                   Figure 23 
 
                    Figure 24
The Reload.xml file is identical across both a Restore and a Refresh process. So this value must dictate 
that certain files where restored to the factory default. This may change with machines that are running 
the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface. 
Even though Windows 8, has the ability to reset the operating system back to factory default, it is not 
impossible to do analysis and data carving on the unallocated spaces to find artifacts that once 
remained on the machine. As you can see from the image below, even after I did a reset on the 
machine, which should have returned everything to the factory default, I was still able to carve out my 
test file, my username, and some files related to the file history option.  
ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2013 
 
99 
 
Figure 25 
6. CONCLUSION 
With the inclusion of new features in Windows 8 there is an increased volume of artifacts that will be 
useful to analysis for profiling user behavior and actions. While the majority of the features have made 
it easier for analysis some have increased the difficulty for extraction.  
One of the more Forensic friendly features added to Windows 8 would be the Communication App. 
This app if utilized by the end user is able to provide a wealth of Forensic artifacts that might normally 
be available on a users machine. Through the artifacts that are created I am able to see the users 
various contacts across all connected accounts as well as messages, usernames and email addresses. 
This application allows analysis to get information that at times required contacting individual third 
parties for the data.  
With the addition of FileHistory in Windows 8 it has given analysts potentially new avenues for 
investigation. With the ability to have many accounts backing up to the same location analysts now 
have the ability to find outlying computers or accounts that were previously unknown. With the 
behavior of changing FileHistory locations not clearing data from previous locations this gives 
analysts the ability to find evidence on forgotten drives.   
Finally the availability of an interactive GUI for system recovery allows end users to quickly restore 
their system to a previous state. Depending on the recovery method utilized on the system it would be 
beneficial for analysts to know which method result in the destruction of artifacts before spending time 
trying to analyze a system that has been reset.  
Except for the loss of artifacts from a Thorough System Reset, Microsoft has made the ability to find 
forensic artifacts easier. With the multiple locations that an artifact may remain in, the ease of backing 
up data, and the importation of third party account information the amount of user identifiable 
information is greatly increased.  
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